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ARTICLE
THE PERNICIOUS EFFECT OF DUBIOUS MATERIALITY
Timothy M. Todd †
“As now construed, § 1014 covers false explanations for arriving
late at a meeting, false assurances that an applicant does not mind
if the loan officer lights up a cigar, false expressions of enthusiasm
about the results of a football game or an election, as well as false
compliments about the subject of a family photograph.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
According to many scholars and commentators, we live in an overly
criminalized era.2 Over-criminalization can take two main forms:3 first,
actual over-authorization of criminal sanctions by legislatures,4 and second,
over-application by prosecutors (or courts).5 This short symposium Article
adds to the over-criminalization zeitgeist by arguing that the absence of
express materiality qualifiers in statutes necessarily adds troubling
overbreadth to statutes. Moreover, even when materiality is an element of the

† Timothy M. Todd is Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of
Law at Liberty University School of Law.
1. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 502 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2. See, e.g., Lucian E. Dervan, White Collar Overcriminalization: Deterrence, Plea
Bargaining, and the Loss of Innocence, 101 KY. L.J. 723 (2013); Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime
to Tear Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46
EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997); Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND.
L. REV. 1191 (2015); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703,
719-39 (2005); Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: New Approaches to a Growing Problem,
102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529 (2012); Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
COLUM. L. REV. 55, 79-80 (1933); George J. Terwilliger III, Under-Breaded Shrimp and other
High Crimes: Addressing the Over-Criminalization of Commercial Regulation, 44 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1417 (2007); Dick Thornburgh, The Challenge of Over-Criminalization, 33-DEC PA. LAW.
36 (2011); Ekow N. Yankah, A Paradox in Overcriminalization, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2011);
see generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL Law
(2008).
3. Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the
Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1545–46 (1997).
4. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 715, 735 (2013) (“The principal form that overcriminalization takes is the
passage of unnecessary criminal statutes.”).
5. Green, supra note 3, at 1545–46.
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offense, its judicial construction can effectively nullify any purported
protection. The net effect of both phenomena is a pernicious creep of overcriminalization that undercuts a free society.
II. BACKGROUND
The Framers were acutely concerned with the extent and power of
criminal laws.6 For instance, Alexander Hamilton wrote as follows in
Federalist No. 83:
I must acknowledge, that I cannot readily discern the inseparable
connection between the existence of liberty, and the trial by jury,
in civil cases. Arbitrary impeachments, arbitrary methods of
prosecuting pretended offences, and arbitrary punishments upon
arbitrary convictions, have ever appeared to me the great engines
of judicial despotism; and all these have relation to criminal
proceedings.7
This concern is best embodied by the various protections provided in the
federal Constitution to prevent such abuses by placing express limits on the
government’s ability to create and execute criminal penalties. Additional
express examples of protecting the citizenry from the state’s criminal law
power are burdens of proof and persuasion; presumption of innocence; the
Fifth Amendment and the privilege against self-incrimination; double
jeopardy protections; and prohibitions on ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder.8
Historical concerns about the rise of the criminal state are borne out by
recent statistics. In 2005, about 2.2 million persons were incarcerated in
federal or state prison, which is a rate of 737 inmates per 100,000 residents.9
In other words, 1 in every 138 residents was incarcerated.10 In 2015, the

6. See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 4, at 725–26 (“The Framers were concerned that a
voluminous criminal code was a threat to liberty, so federal criminal law started out small,
protecting only what was necessary to get the new, limited national government up and
running.”). In fact, “[t]he first federal criminal statute outlawed no more than approximately
thirty crimes, and each one was closely tied to the needs of the new enterprise.” Id. at 726.
7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
8. Ronald A. Cass, Overcriminalization: Administrative Regulation, Prosecutorial
Discretion, and the Rule of Law, 15 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 14 (2014).
9. DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 4 (2008).
10. Id.

2018]

THE PERNICIOUS EFFECT

317

actively incarcerated population was 2,173,800,11 with an incarceration rate
of 670 per 100,000 residents.12 Indeed, the prison population rates have nearly
quadrupled since the 1980s.13
Looking internationally, as a point of comparison, “the United States has
by far the highest rate in the world—nearly five times higher than that of any
other Western industrialized country.”14 Even more troubling (and sad) is
that “[a]n estimated 1 in 20 children born in the United States is destined to
serve time in a state or federal prison at some point in his life.”15 Moreover,
“[m]inorities are disproportionately represented behind bars: 12.6% of all
black men ages 25 to 29 are in jails or prisons, compared with 1.7% of
similarly-aged whites.”16 Perhaps surprisingly, only 7.9% of federal prisoners
in 2009 were convicted of violent crimes.17
Although incarceration rates are a commonly used metric, a more robust
measure of over-criminalization is the number of people under the
supervision of the criminal justice system, such as those on probation or
parole.18 Data from the early 2000s indicate that 4.2 million persons in the
United States are on probation and approximately 784,000 are on parole;19
the latter are, of course, subject to incarceration if they violate the terms of
their release. More recent data indicate that, as of 2015, there are 875,000 on
parole and nearly 3.8 million on probation.20 Between the actively
incarcerated population and those on probation or parole, there are
6,741,400 persons under the control of the criminal justice system.21
The effects of over-criminalization do not end with release at the prison
gates; they extend into reentry and often follow offenders for the rest of their
lives. As Professor Michelle Alexander has noted, “[e]ven when released from
the system’s formal control, the stigma of criminality lingers,”22 and other

11. Daniel Kaeble & Lauren Glaze, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2015,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus15.pdf.
12. Id.
13. HUSAK, supra note 9, at 5.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 4.
16. Id.
17. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 101 (2012).
18. HUSAK, supra note 9, at 4–5.
19. Id.
20. Kaeble & Glaze, supra note 11.
21. Id.
22. ALEXANDER, supra note 17, at 141.
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commentators have referred to a prison sentence as “the mark of Cain.”23
Indeed, as Professor Alexander avers, a criminal record basically allows
“discrimination in employment, housing, education, public benefits, and jury
service.”24 A troubling aspect of the many collateral consequences is that they
make it difficult for offenders to fully reintegrate into society.25 Consequently,
“these sanctions can be the most damaging and painful aspect of a criminal
conviction.”26
Quantifying the actual level of over-criminalization is a devilishly
nettlesome endeavor.27 The number of criminal statutes and laws are used as
a proxy for it, though even this is not an ideal metric.28 The United States
Code is approximately 27,000 pages of printed text.29 In those 27,000 pages,
there are approximately 3,300 provisions with criminal sanctions, many of
which are codified in Title 18.30 Other estimates peg the number at 4,000.31
When factoring in federal regulations, the provisions with sanctions
balloon—to 300,000 regulations with sanctions, by some estimates.32 In fact,
“[a] blue ribbon ABA task force found that more than forty percent of federal
criminal provisions passed after the Civil War had been enacted in the
twenty-eight year period between 1970 and 1998.”33 A Federalist Society
study found that “there had been a thirty percent increase in federal offenses
23. Id. at 142.
24. Id. at 141.
25. Id. at 143.
26. Id.; see also Internal Exile: Collateral Consequences of Conviction in Federal Laws and
Regulations,
A.B.A. (Jan.
2009),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/cecs/internalexile.authcheckdam.pdf.
27. HUSAK, supra note 9, at 9.
28. See id. at 7–9.
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id. (citation omitted). Indeed, while the mere numerosity is compelling, this does not
even broach the issues that are implicated by the federalization of local crime. See, e.g., John S.
Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673
(1999); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 643 (1997). Chief Justice Rehnquist presciently warned against this trend: “The trend to
federalize crimes that traditionally have been handled in state courts . . . threatens to change
entirely the nature of our federal system . . . . Federal courts were not created to adjudicate
local crimes, no matter how sensational or heinous the crimes may be.” Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist, The 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 134, 135
(1999); see also Larkin, supra note 4.
31. Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 753 (2005).
32. See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 10.
33. Beale, supra note 31, at 753.
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carrying criminal penalties between 1980 and 2004.”34 It is shocking—and
sad—that it has been said that “not even the Justice Department, knows the
actual number of federal criminal offenses.”35
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that over-criminalization cannot
just be limited to a review of statutes and convictions; we must be mindful of
all those interactions with the justice system that do not result in a conviction
or even a prosecution. For instance, in 2004 there were approximately 14
million arrests made.36 Of course, not all of those arrests ended in prosecution
and conviction, but the people who were arrested still suffered
consequences—both at the time of the arrest and going forward.37
Over-criminalization research has often focused on over-authorization of
criminal sanctions by legislatures. This stream of over-criminalization makes
relatively innocuous conduct (or at least conduct without actual substantive
harm) criminal. There are myriad examples of such over-criminalization in
various penal codes. Professor Eric Luna provides some salient examples:
Delaware punishes by up to six months imprisonment the sale of
perfume or lotion as a beverage. In Alabama, it is a felony to maim
one’s self to “excite sympathy” or to train a bear to wrestle, while
Nevada criminalizes the disturbance of a congregation at worship

34. Id. at 754.
35. Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 739 (2012); see also Larkin, supra note 4.
36. See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 13 (citation omitted).
37. For instance, in future questionnaires or applications that ask if the respondent has
ever been arrested. This can affect many aspects of life such as employment and even
international travel (e.g., in visa applications). Edwin Meese and Paul Larkin described the
consequences of exposing a morally blameless person to the criminal justice system:
Dragging a morally blameless person into the criminal justice system forces
him—as well as his family, friends, colleagues, and anyone else who cares for
him—to endure the series of harms and indignities that a modern law
enforcement bureaucracy inflicts on every suspect, the guilty and innocent alike:
being arrested, undergoing a thorough probing of one’s person and whatever is
worn or carried incident to a search following arrest; being handcuffed, driven
to the police station in the back seat of a patrol car, booked, waiting for hours in
a temporary holding cell, and doing the ‘perp walk’ before the media; waiting in
jail until bail is posted (a cost that will never be recouped); paying for a lawyer
with one’s life savings or child’s college fund; and spending a terribly long and
painful period awaiting trial while the police and media investigate, and
sometime publicize, every embarrassing aspect of one’s life.
Meese & Larkin, supra note 35, at 753–54. Moreover, these consequences are even more
exacerbated now with the advent of Internet searches and archives, which puts this
information indefinitely in easy grasp of everyone forever.
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by “engaging in any boisterous or noisy amusement.” Tennessee
makes it a misdemeanor to hunt wildlife from an aircraft, Indiana
bans the coloring of birds and rabbits, Massachusetts punishes
those who frighten pigeons from their nests, and Texas declares it
a felony to use live animals as lures in dog racing. In turn, spitting
in public spaces is a misdemeanor in Virginia, and anonymously
sending an indecent or “suggestive” message in South Carolina is
punishable by up to three years imprisonment.38
Even more salient examples include the unauthorized use of “Smokey Bear”
images39 and unauthorized use of the 4-H Club insignia.40
Professor Douglas Husak, in his book on over-criminalization, posits
three categories of penal code innovations that spurred the growth of
criminal laws: (1) overlapping crimes, which describe re-criminalizing the
same conduct;41 (2) risk-prevention crimes, which describe offenses that do
not necessarily require harm, but only the possibility of harm;42 and (3)
ancillary crimes, which describe instances in which other statutes are charged
or prosecuted when the underlying core offense cannot be established.43
Another interesting thread in the over-criminalization literature is the
problematic integration of criminal sanctions in complicated regulatory
regimes.44 As commentators have noted, “[t]hat practice can pose
extraordinary compliance problems for the average person because criminal
and regulatory laws exist for very different purposes.”45 In sum, “[t]reating
regulatory crimes as if they were no different than ‘street’ crimes ignores the
profound difference between the two classes of offenses and puts parties

38. Eric Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U.L. REV. 703, 704 (2005)
(citation omitted).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 711 (2012); see also Beale, supra note 31, at 761.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 707 (2012); see also Beale, supra note 31, at 761.
41. One provided example is criminalizing the destruction of library books, when
property destruction in general is already proscribed. See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 37. As Husak
argues, “the main effect of these overlapping statutes is to allow charge stacking that threatens
defendants with increasingly severe punishments.” Id. at 38.
42. Examples are driving with a cell phone or juvenile curfew laws. Id. at 38.
43. An example is failure to file a Bank Secrecy Act report when required. Id. at 41.
44. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Regulation, Prohibition, and Overcriminalization: The
Proper and Improper Uses of Criminal Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 746 (2014).
45. Id.
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engaged in entirely legitimate activities without any intent to break the law at
risk of criminal punishment.”46
As this Article argues, though, there are additional, more subtle and
pernicious forms of over-criminalization. First, the absence of express
materiality qualifiers in statutes necessarily adds troubling overbreadth to
statutes. Second, even when materiality is an element, its judicial
construction can nullify any purported protection.
III. ABSENCE OF EXPRESS MATERIALITY ELEMENTS IN CRIMINAL STATUTES
In United States v. Wells,47 the Supreme Court was presented with the issue
of whether materiality is an element of 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which basically
makes it a crime to knowingly make a misstatement to a federally insured
bank.48 In a nutshell, the government charged the defendants under § 1014
for concealing the true terms of lease contracts, which placed on their
corporation (and not its customers) the obligation to service equipment.49
According to the government, the service obligations were hidden to avoid
freeing up cash flow that the bank might have otherwise required to be in
reserve had it known the true extent of the service obligations.50 Additionally,
the defendants were charged under § 1014 for “forging” their wives’
signatures on personal guarantees to the bank.51
In analyzing whether materiality was a required element under § 1014, the
Court defined the term “materiality” in this context as “‘ha[ving] a natural
tendency to influence, or [being] capable of influencing, the decision of the
decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.’”52 The Court used a threepart framework in its analysis: (1) examine the text of the statute; (2) examine
the common-law meaning of the terms used; and (3) examine statutory
(legislative) history.53

46. Id. As Larkin later notes, “If you lie, cheat, steal, or physically harm someone, you
have broken the law. Said differently, if you know the Decalogue, you know what not to do.
By contrast, regulatory statutes are long, elaborate, intricate, and reticulated.” Id. at 754.
47. 519 U.S. 482 (1997).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2012).
49. Wells, 519 U.S. at 484–85.
50. Id. at 485.
51. Id.
52. Wells, 519 U.S. at 489 (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
53. Id.; see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999); Megan L. Hoffman, Comment,
The Substantial Weight Test: A Proposal to Resolve The Circuits’ Disparate Interpretations Of
Materiality Under The False Claims Act, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 181 (2009).
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The Court, of course, noted that “[n]owhere does [§ 1014] further say that
a material fact must be the subject of the false statement or so much as
mention materiality.”54 Rather, the Court emphasized that “its terms cover
‘any’ false statement that meets the other requirements in the statute, and the
term ‘false statement’ carries no general suggestion of influential
significance.”55 Next, the Court concluded that, at common law, the term
“false statement” did not have an acquired meaning requiring materiality.56
Finally, the Court observed that when § 1014 was originally enacted,
Congress explicitly included materiality requirements in other sections
regarding false representations.57 Therefore, the Court reasoned, “[t]he most
likely inference in these circumstances is that Congress deliberately dropped
the term ‘materiality’ without intending materiality to be an element of §
1014.”58
The Court did at least pay lip service to the concern that by not reading
materiality into § 1014, it may “impose substantial criminal penalties on
relatively trivial or innocent conduct.”59 In effect, the Court explained that
the mens rea element in § 1014—requiring that “the speaker knows the falsity
of what he says and intends it to influence the institution”60—effectively
mitigates the over-criminalization concern.61 As explained in Part IV, this is
myopic and offers, at best, only a veneer of protection in some cases.
A. The Problem of Eroding Materiality
The rationale in Wells and cases of its ilk, which eliminate or erode
materiality and other statutory safeguards, is hugely problematic because
these cases needlessly expose citizens to the specter of criminal prosecution.
As Justice Stevens explained in his Wells dissent,

54. Wells, 519 U.S. at 490.
55. Id. at 490 (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 781 (1988); Kay v. United
States, 303 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1938)).
56. Wells, 519 U.S. at 490.
57. Id. at 492.
58. Id. at 493 (citing United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1994)).
59. Id. at 498 (citing United States v. Williams, 12 F.3d 452, 458 (5th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Staniforth, 971 F.2d 1355, 1358 (7th Cir. 1992)).
60. Wells, 519 U.S. at 499.
61. Ironically, the Court noted that it already had to cabin the scope of § 1014 as applied
to bad checks in order to prevent § 1014 from making a “broad range of unremarkable conduct
a violation of federal law.” Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1982). Basically,
the Court believes its ad hoc and post hoc declarations of overbreadth are sufficient to protect
the facially broad sweep of § 1014.
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As now construed, § 1014 covers false explanations for arriving
late at a meeting, false assurances that an applicant does not mind
if the loan officer lights up a cigar, false expressions of enthusiasm
about the results of a football game or an election, as well as false
compliments about the subject of a family photograph. So long as
the false statement is made “for the purpose of influencing” a bank
officer, it violates § 1014.62
Justice Stevens persuasively advanced three reasons why federal false
statement statutes should have materiality qualifiers. First, he argued that, in
common law, neither false statements nor misrepresentations encompassed
“immaterial falsehoods, such as mere flattery.”63 Second, and perhaps most
compelling, is his point that many federal false statement statutes lack an
express materiality requirement:64 “[A]t least 100 federal false statement
statutes may be found in the United States Code. About 42 of them contain
an express materiality requirement; approximately 54 do not.”65 Indeed, he
noted that “[t]he kinds of false statements found in the first category are, to
my eyes at least, indistinguishable from those in the second category. Nor is
there any obvious distinction between the range of punishments authorized
by the two different groups of statutes.”66 Third, and finally, he emphasized
that, in the jurisprudential ebb of the 1940s—when § 1014 was enacted—
Congress relied more on the Court to fill gaps in the law based on the
common-law tradition.67
In sum, the concern is that criminal statutes without robust materiality
and specificity invite “abuse on the part of prosecuting officials, who are left
free to harass any individuals or groups who may be the object of official
displeasure.”68
B. The Problems with Defining Materiality
Having materiality expressly required as an element in a statute is,
everything else being equal, better than not having it at all. There are still
62. Wells, 519 U.S. at 502 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 504.
64. Id. at 505.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 505–06.
67. Wells, 519 U.S. at 509–10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As he quipped, “[i]t was only three
years earlier that one of the greatest judges of the era—indeed, of any era—had admonished
us ‘not to make a fortress out of the dictionary.’” Id. at 510 (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148
F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945)).
68. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 775 (1974).
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issues, however, with using materiality in statutes, mainly related to the
concept of legal (un)certainty.69 Materiality can be a subjective and nebulous
standard; it is challenging to demarcate its contours. Consequently, citizens
who rely on materiality to inform and guide their conduct will likely find it a
poor guide. Additionally, even express materiality may be in a weak form,
offering only a veneer of protection, and the threshold to trigger materiality
is so low that overbroad application is still an issue. These shortcomings are
antithetical to a legal system rooted in individual freedom and liberty.70
C. Fuzzy Materiality and Predictability
As Holmes remarked, “the tendency of the law must always be to narrow
the field of uncertainty.”71 Indeed, legal uncertainty is undesirable and
suboptimal.72 Uncertainty is the enemy of predictability, and predictability—
which is a function of “[c]onsistency and stability”73—is the hallmark of a just
legal system.74 Only with consistency and stability “can the law be predictable
to those who must shape their conduct by it and to lower courts which must
apply it.”75
However, a wooden cry of “materiality” does not advance the dual
interests of consistency and stability because the standard is so nebulous. Like
Nero’s strategy of posting edicts too high for his citizens, our current system
makes it easy for people to run afoul of the law,76 oftentimes with the benefit

69. See generally H.W.R. Wade, The Concept of Legal Certainty: A Preliminary Skirmish,
4 MOD. L. REV. 183 (1941).
70. Id. at 189 (“As law exists for security, confidence and freedom, it must be invested
with as much certainty and uniformity as can be provided by the wavering structures of human
institutions.”).
71. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881).
72. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1179 (1989) (“Even in simpler times uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the
Rule of Law.”).
73. Williams v. State of N.C., 317 U.S. 287, 323 (1942) (“This Court may follow
precedents, irrespective of their merits, as a matter of obedience to the rule of stare decisis.
Consistency and stability may be so served. They are ends desirable in themselves, for only
thereby can the law be predictable to those who must shape their conduct by it and to lower
courts which must apply it.”).
74. Scalia, supra note 72, at 1179 (“Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the
law must have the means of knowing what it prescribes.”).
75. Williams, 317 U.S. at 323.
76. “It is said that one of emperor Nero’s nasty practices was to post his edicts high on the
columns so that they would be harder to read and easier to transgress.” Scalia, supra note 72,
at 1179.
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of hindsight to boot.77 In sum, if materiality qualifiers still do not “effectively
guide action,” then there is still undesirable uncertainty in the system.
A classic example of nebulous or “fuzzy” materiality is in the context of
securities regulation. The Securities Act of 193378 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,79 of course, make it illegal to, among other things, make a
material misstatement of fact in connection with an array of securities-based
transactions.80
The Supreme Court, in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.,81 defined
materiality in the context of SEC Rule 14a-982 as
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote . . . . Put another way, there must be a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
the “total mix” of information made available.83
What exactly, then, constitutes an item of information that would
significantly alter the “total mix” of information made available?
Commentators and practitioners have critiqued this standard for its
opaqueness;84 some have referred to materiality as an “ulcerating experience”
and as a “gotcha” standard.85 Indeed, even courts have observed that
materiality has become one of the most unpredictable and elusive
concepts of the federal securities laws. The SEC itself has despaired
of providing written guidelines to advise wary corporate
77. That is, in retrospect, something may appear “material” given the development of
other facts—and, of course, with the ever-granting clarity of hindsight bias, though, at the
time, such clarity was murky at best.
78. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–
77aa (2012)).
79. Pub. L. 73–291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.).
80. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
81. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
82. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1975). This rule provides that a proxy solicitation cannot be
“false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact
necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading.” Id.
83. TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449.
84. See, e.g., Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept Of “Materiality” Under U.S.
Federal Securities Laws, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 663–64 (2004); Richard C. Sauer, The
Erosion of Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of Federal Securities Laws, 62 BUS. LAW.
317, 319 (2007).
85. Lee, supra note 84, at 664.
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management of the distinctions between material and nonmaterial information, and instead has chosen to rely on an afterthe-fact, case-by-case approach, seeking injunctive relief when it
believes that the appropriate boundaries have been breached.86
Despite its decisional opaqueness and uncertainty, “[t]he ‘materiality’
threshold therefore ‘plays a critical gatekeeper[s’] role’ by separating the
essential information from the ‘less important information that would be
extraneous or irrelevant to investors.’”87 Nevertheless, “[m]ateriality
determinations in individual cases tend to be so fact-specific that the
accumulated body of published case law provides limited guidance for
decision-making.”88
As demonstrated, just adding a “materiality” qualifier does not necessarily
provide sterling clarity and may just raise a different set of questions. Any
ambiguity still subjects decision-makers to compliance costs, risk, and the
possibility of needless scrutiny. As the Court noted in Cardiff, “[w]ords which
are vague and fluid . . . may be as much of a trap for the innocent as the
ancient laws of Caligula.”89
In sum, even express materiality requirements, if not sufficiently defined,
do not serve the purpose of informing citizens what exact conduct is
prohibited. It is axiomatic that vague statutes “violate[] the first essential of
due process of law.”90 Justice Sutherland noted,
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a
well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary
notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due
process of law.91

86. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Address by Ray
Garrett, Jr., Chairman of the SEC, “An Inside Look at Rule 10b-5,” ALI-ABA Conference,
April 10, 1975)).
87. Lee, supra note 84, at 662 (internal citations omitted).
88. Sauer, supra note 84, at 319.
89. United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952).
90. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
91. Id. at 391 (citations omitted).
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Ambiguous materiality, therefore, can lead to inefficiencies, and certainly
fails to educate the populace about their respective obligations.92 A more
detailed and bright-line standard, on the other hand, is more efficient. As
Ehrlich and Posner noted, “[a] perfectly detailed and comprehensive set of
rules brings society nearer to its desired allocation of resources by
discouraging socially undesirable activities and encouraging socially
desirable ones.”93 Moreover, they note,
The more (efficiently) precise and detailed the applicable
substantive standard or rule is, the higher is the probability that
the activity will be deemed illegal if it is in fact undesirable (the
kind of activity the legislature wanted to prevent) and the lower is
the probability that the activity will be deemed illegal if it is in fact
desirable.94
Continuing the analysis, individuals can only avoid criminal penalty by
avoiding the criminal activity.95 With a vague or unclear statute (or relevant
standard—such as ambiguous materiality), they must not only avoid the core
obviously criminal conduct, but also all other behavior that might possibly
fall under “the penumbra of the vague standard”—even if that conduct is
useful or beneficial.96 Indeed, then, “the social costs of vague criminal
standards might be high.”97
D. Weak-Form Materiality
In addition to the subjective, nebulous, and fuzzy aspects of a generic
materiality requirement, another issue is whether the materiality threshold
has been lowered so much that it does not provide the intended prophylactic
(or therapeutic) benefit. Stated otherwise, if it is overly inclusive and includes
too many items within its ambit, then it offers no real protection at all—that
is when materiality covers even the trivial.

92. “Contemporary statutes and regulations are often written in terms making it difficult
for an experienced lawyer to understand their meaning, let alone someone untutored and
inexperienced in the law.” Larkin, supra note 44, at 757.
93. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 257, 262 (1974).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 263.
96. Id.
97. Id. To be sure, the more detailed a rule is, though, it will need to be changed more
often. Id. at 278. The level of detail, then, is also a source of the rule’s costs. Id.
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E. Example of Weak-Form Materiality
One potential example of weak-form materiality is 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1),
which makes it a felony for any person who “[w]illfully makes and subscribes
any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a
written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which
he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter.”98 Here
materiality is expressly in the statute, yet the case law interpreting § 7206 has
made its materiality element a nullity. Further, the government often
“charges a taxpayer who files a false return under both the perjury and
evasion penalty provisions because, unlike the evasion charge, the perjury
charge doesn’t require proof that tax is due and owing.”99
A material matter, in this context, is defined as “one that is likely to affect
the calculation of tax due and payable.”100 This standard, on its face, is of no
help: Even a dollar misstatement as to income or expense items can affect the
calculation of tax due and payable. It is possible—indeed likely—that a
misstatement can be insubstantial (in dollar terms) but be material under §
7206.
There are two competing views to interpreting the § 7206 materiality
standard: (1) the Warden test, which holds that anything that affects the tax
calculation is material,101 and (2) the DiVarco test, which holds that an item
is material if it “would have a tendency to influence the IRS in its normal
processing of tax returns.”102 Under at least the Warden test, then, it seems
that even a one-dollar misstatement would be material under § 7206.
Some taxpayers have advanced insubstantiality arguments.103 However,
those arguments generally have not been successful.104 For instance, the
Second Circuit noted, in the context of § 7206(1), that “[f]alse statements
about income do not have to involve substantial amounts in order to violate

98. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
99. FEDERAL TAX COORDINATOR (RIA) ¶ V-3101.
100. United States v. Griffin, 524 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Boulerice, 325
F.3d 75, 82 n.3 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. DiRico, 78 F.3d 732, 735–36 (1st Cir.
1996)).
101. United States v. Warden, 545 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 2008); see, e.g., MICHAEL SALTZMAN
& LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRAC. & PROC. ¶ 12.02; DOJ Criminal Tax Manual 12.10[4] (2012 ed.).
102. United States v. DiVarco, 343 F. Supp. 101, 103 (N.D. Ill. 1972); SALTZMAN & BOOK,
supra note 101, at 12.02. This definition is also consistent with United States v. Gaudin, 515
U.S. 506, 509 (1995).
103. See, e.g., DOJ Criminal Tax Manual, 12.10[5], at 18.
104. See, e.g., id. at 18–19.
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this statute.”105 The Seventh Circuit, as well, noted that “[t]his Court has
previously held that false statements relating to gross income, irrespective of
the amount, constitute a material misstatement in violation of Section
7206(1).”106 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s statement to the
jury that “the issue in a section 7206(1) prosecution is whether the
misstatements were material, not whether they were substantial.”107 The
court further emphasized that “the substantiality of the misstatements was
not relevant to the prosecution under section 7206.”108
Courts that have elucidated the rationale for § 7206 noted that the issue is
not simply the collection of tax revenue. As the Second Circuit explained,
The purpose of § 7206(1) is not simply to ensure that the taxpayer
pay the proper amount of taxes—though that is surely one of its
goals. Rather, that section is intended to ensure also that the
taxpayer not make misstatements that could hinder the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) in carrying out such functions as the
verification of the accuracy of that return or a related tax return.109
Consequently, under this rationale, the insubstantiality of the misstatement’s
effect on actual tax collection is irrelevant. Another outgrowth, perhaps
surprisingly, of that rationale is that an actual tax deficiency may not even be
needed for a § 7206 prosecution.110
IV. THE RETORTS OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND
MENS REA PROTECTIONS
There are at least two (and probably more) legitimate responses to the
critiques advanced by this Article. First, prosecutorial discretion (and the
goal of efficiency) makes it likely that trivial offenses will not be prosecuted.
Second, applicable mens rea requirements also insulate citizens from being
prosecuted for “innocent” conduct. However, both of these grounds may not
be as strong as they seem.

105. United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 92 (2d Cir. 1991).
106. United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1196 (7th Cir. 1980).
107. United States v. Gaines, 690 F.2d 849, 857 (7th Cir. 1982).
108. Id. at 858.
109. United States v. Greenberg, 735 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1984).
110. See, e.g., Schepps v. United States, 395 F.2d 749, 749 (5th Cir. 1968) (“[A]ppellant says
that he should have been allowed to introduce proof showing that the falsity resulted in no tax
deficiency. This proof was not relevant to the issue raised by the indictment and it was not
error to reject it . . . .”).
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Enforcement is costly.111 Normatively, then—at least from a law-andeconomics perspective—“[t]he goal of enforcement, let us assume, is to
achieve that degree of compliance with the rule of prescribed (or proscribed)
behavior that the society believes it can afford.”112 As Professor LaFave has
written, “[o]ne of the most striking features of the American system of
criminal justice is the broad range of largely uncontrolled discretion
exercised by the prosecutor.”113 We hope, therefore, that prosecutors, with
their great and often unchecked discretion, dedicate their limited resources
to the prosecution of “real” crimes,114 which provides the greatest benefit to
the community.115
Indeed, in the age of the plea bargain, the prosecutor is the “preeminent
actor in the system.”116 Justice Robert Jackson commented that the federal
prosecutor has “more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other
person in America.”117 Judge Easterbrook has described the prosecutor’s
discretion well:
Prosecutors have absolute discretion. They may prosecute whom
they please, for such crimes as they please. They may decline to
prosecute particular crimes or whole categories of offenses, such
as drug offenses or resale price maintenance . . . . They are
responsible only to their superiors and the public. No public
official has more discretion; few participants in private markets
have more.118

111. George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970).
112. Id.
113. Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L.
532, 532 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
114. Indeed, to make the prosecutor prosecute all crimes is simply unworkable—it would
be “like directing a general to attack the enemy on all fronts at once.” LaFave, supra note 113,
at 534 (citing T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 153 (1962)).
115. LaFave, supra note 113, at 534.
116. Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
717, 718 (1996). Interestingly, the history of the American prosecutor is an amalgamation of
historical influences. For example, like the English Attorney General, the prosecutor can end
prosecutions; like the French “procureur publique,” the prosecutor starts prosecutions; and
finally, like the Dutch “schout,” the prosecutor is normally a local official over a particular
region. See id. at 728.
117. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18, 18 (1940);
see Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from Current
White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 165 (2004).
118. Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market, 12 J. LEGAL STUDIES 289, 299
(1983).
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Prosecutorial discretion—or the hope that prosecutors will only go after
“real” crimes—in many instances is not adequate protection. As applied to
vague laws, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[a] vague law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis . . . .”119
Another aspect of prosecutorial discretion is that it is potentially subject
to abuses. For example, Professor Alexander, in her compelling book, The
New Jim Crow,120 reviewed the literature and noted, “[t]hese studies have
shown that youth of color are more likely to be arrested, detained, formally
charged, transferred to adult court, and confined to secure residential
facilities than their white counterparts.”121 She also noted, in the context of
drug offenses, that “[r]acial bias is most acute at the point of entry into the
system for two reasons: discretion and authorization.”122
Moreover, as other commentators have argued in other contexts, “the
existence of rarely-used statutes invites (if not demands) selective
enforcement and unequal treatment of similarly situated defendants.”123
Indeed, when this is the case, prosecutors may “single out and punish one
defendant, or perhaps a handful of defendants, for conduct that is
widespread.”124 Ambiguous or vague statutes, moreover, “offend due process
by failing to provide explicit standards for those who enforce them thus
allowing discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement.”125
Highly selective enforcement can also be problematic. For example, Dean
Ronald Cass provides the following example:
Further, highly selective enforcement, if it is to affect underlying
behavior, cannot reveal the bases on which enforcement targets
will be selected—imagine the IRS announcing which deductions
of what magnitude will cause the agency to audit tax filers. The
result is that the basis for selecting a small number of potential
targets for prosecution is not visible to, or predictable by, the
public. That sort of discretion, which is largely insulated from
119. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
120. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 118 (2012).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 123.
123. Beale, supra note 31, at 757.
124. Id.
125. “[V]ague statutes offend due process by failing to provide explicit standards for those
who enforce them thus allowing discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement.” Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733, 775 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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significant sources of constraint in individual cases, is antithetical
to the rule of law.126
Unfortunately, selective enforcement challenges are often unsuccessful.127
Other realities of the system need to be considered as well—factors that
further weaken the perceived protection of prosecutorial discretion. The
ability to stack (or multiply) charges, which compounds the potential
sentence, “allows prosecutors to pressure defendants to settle rather than to
fight, to enter a plea bargain that admits guilt (whether it truly existed or
addressed conduct that was truly wrongful in any meaningful sense), and to
take a small punishment.”128 Charging decisions, moreover, are largely
unreviewable, except in limited circumstances, such as race discrimination.129
In addition, the risk is present even when the defendant might not have
done anything wrong. Cass writes,
[I]f the risk is large enough—if the penalties that are threatened
are sufficiently draconian—and the costs of litigating high
enough, defendants might accept quite harsh punishment, even
when they believe they’ve done nothing wrong and are confronted
with criminal charges of which they’ve had no fair warning.130
The drop in the number of actual trials and the corresponding increase in
the number of plea bargains further erode the protection of prosecutorial
discretion.131 Prosecutors have traditionally been checked by limited
resources (like time and money) and by the judicial process (at trial).132 With
most cases ending in a plea bargain—some estimate the federal settlement
rate at 97%133—those checks are largely gone. Although frivolous charges are
unlikely to exert undue pressure, “arguably sustainable charges, even if based
on weak and contestable grounds, combined with a large number of charges
with at least a slight prospect of success can suffice to pressure defendants to

126. Ronald A. Cass, Overcriminalization: Administrative Regulations, Prosecutorial
Discretion, and The Rule of Law, 15 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 11, 23 (2014).
127. See, e.g., Misner, supra note 116.
128. Cass, supra note 126, at 23–24.
129. Misner, supra note 116, at 717.
130. Cass, supra note 126, at 24.
131. Id. at 3.
132. Id. at 24.
133. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Federal Guilty Pleas Soar as Bargains Trump Trials,
STREET
JOURNAL,
(Sept.
23,
2012),
available
at
WALL
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443589304577637610097206808.
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settle.”134 This phenomenon is compounded by the nature of overlapping
provisions.135 And the last check—the political process—may not be effective
either.136 At bottom, “[t]he plain fact is that more than nine-tenths of local
prosecutors’ decisions are supervised or reviewed by no one.”137
Another common refrain is that if a prosecutor does not level charges
against the particular conduct, then “no harm, no foul.” However, this, too,
is myopic. For one, it ignores the “freedom-limiting, anxiety-producing, and
guilt-inducing effects the criminal law may have on those who take its
demands seriously, even apart from the threat of punishment.”138 Absent a
well-demarcated line of legality, citizens may have to wait to see if their
conduct is deemed “criminal” by the local or federal prosecutor. The
alternative is to wait until the applicable statute of limitations runs out—if
there is such a limitation.139
Mens rea is also advanced as a defense against various criminal charges,
and, of course, it does serve that purpose in various contexts. Mens rea—or
evil intent—was a critical element of common-law offenses.140 However,
reliance on mens rea may not properly protect defendants or even properly
isolate criminal conduct.141 For the reasons noted above, questions regarding
intent may necessarily need to be litigated and challenged, potentially at great
cost. In sum, if you have to litigate mens rea or intent, you may have already
lost, and any victory is pyrrhic. This is even assuming the relevant statute has
a mens rea requirement: “Today, Congress oftentimes creates felony offenses
134. Cass, supra note 126, at 24. Although Judge Easterbrook has argued that certain
elements of the criminal justice system—such as the plea bargain process—operate as market
mechanisms, helping set the “price” of crime. Easterbrook, supra note 118, at 289.
135. Misner, supra note 116, at 737.
136. As Professor LaFave argues, “And while the local prosecutor is in theory responsible
to the electorate, the public can hardly assess prosecution policies which are kept secret.”
LaFave, supra note 113, at 538; see also Misner, supra note 116 at 717 (“[B]ecause of the current
diffusion of responsibility, the electorate cannot easily scrutinize the actions of any one official
or hold that official independently accountable for the successes or failures of the entire
system. In fact, no one is currently held accountable for the successes or failures of the criminal
justice system.”).
137. KENNETH DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 208 (1969); see also LaFave, supra note 113,
at 538.
138. HUSAK, supra note 9, at 14.
139. For instance, Virginia has no general statute of limitations for felonious offenses.
140. “The common law deemed the presence of ‘evil intent’ necessary to distinguish
morally blameworthy conduct from conduct that, while damaging, dangerous, or tortious, was
not a fit subject for criminal sanction.” Larkin, supra note 44, at 754.
141. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501, 512 (2004).
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that do not require proof of Blackstone’s ‘vicious will.’ These offenses
authorize imprisonment and carry the same moral condemnation as
common law crimes.”142
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed two types of over-criminalization that are often
not discussed in the literature. First, when legislatures omit (or when courts
“read out”) materiality requirements in statutes, the scope of criminal
sanctions is likely expanded beyond what was intended. Second, when
materiality (or similar) qualifiers are placed in a statute, the interpretation of
those qualifiers may nullify the protection they were intended to provide.
Both problems result in a pernicious and subtle form of over-criminalization.

142. Meese & Larkin, supra note 35, at 742 (footnotes omitted).

